In 1952, a group was created in the Military Historical Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army under the leadership of Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky, which began developing a description of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.
For a more complete and objective presentation of the events of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, questions were formulated relating to the period of deployment of troops of the Baltic, Kyiv and Belarusian special military districts according to the “State Border Defense Plan of 1941” on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.
Five main issues were identified:
1. Was the plan for the defense of the state border communicated to the troops as it relates to them? If this plan was communicated to the troops, then when and what was done by the command and troops to ensure the implementation of this plan.
2. From what time and on the basis of what order did the covering troops begin to enter the state border and how many of them were deployed to defend the border before the start of hostilities.
3. When the order was received to put troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22. What and when instructions were given to the troops in pursuance of this order and what was done.
4. Why most of the artillery of corps and divisions was in training camps.
5. To what extent was the unit’s headquarters prepared for command and control of troops and to what extent did this affect the course of operations in the first days of the war.
The assignments were sent to the commanders of districts, armies, corps and division commanders who were in charge in the first days of the war.
The materials received by the Military Historical Directorate, authored by famous Soviet military leaders, were carefully studied and analyzed and formed the basis for fundamental scientific works describing the course of the Great Patriotic War from the point of view of military specialists.
DEREVYANKO KUZMA NIKOLAEVICH, lieutenant general. In 1941 - deputy head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District (North-Western Front)
“The grouping of fascist German troops on the eve of the war in the Memel region, in East Prussia and in the Suwalki region in the last days before the war was known to the district headquarters quite fully and in a significant part of it and in detail.
The uncovered grouping of fascist German troops on the eve of hostilities was regarded by the intelligence department [of the district headquarters] as an offensive group with a significant saturation of tanks and motorized units.”
“The command and headquarters of the district had reliable data on the intensive and direct preparation of Nazi Germany for the war against the Soviet Union 2-3 months before the start of hostilities.
Starting from the second week of the war, much attention was paid to the organization of detachments sent behind enemy lines for the purpose of reconnaissance and sabotage, as well as the organization of radio-equipped reconnaissance groups behind enemy lines and radio-equipped points in the territory occupied by our troops, in case of their forced withdrawal.”
“In the following months, the information received from our groups and detachments working behind enemy lines improved all the time and was of great value.
It was reported on the personally observed concentration of Nazi troops in the border areas, starting from the end of February, on the reconnaissance carried out by German officers along the border, the preparation of artillery positions by the Germans, the strengthening of the construction of long-term defensive structures in the border zone, as well as gas and bomb shelters in the cities of East Prussia ."
SOBENNIKOV PETER PETROVICH, Lieutenant General. In 1941 - Commander of the 8th Army of the Baltic Special Military District (North-Western Front)
“How unexpectedly the war began for the approaching troops can be judged, for example, by the fact that the personnel of the heavy artillery regiment, moving along the railway at dawn on June 22, arrived at the station. Siauliai, having seen the bombing of our airfields, believed that “the maneuvers had begun.”
And at this time, almost all the aviation of the Baltic Military District was burned at the airfields. For example, from the mixed air division, which was supposed to support the 8th Army, by 15:00 on June 22, only 5 or 6 SB aircraft remained.”
“...at about 10-11 o’clock on June 18, I received an order to withdraw parts of the divisions to their defense sectors by the morning of June 19, and Colonel General Kuznetsov [Commander of the PriOVO troops] ordered me to go to the right flank, and he personally went to Taurage, taking upon himself the responsibility of bringing Major General Shumilov's 10th Rifle Corps to combat readiness.
I sent the chief of staff of the army to the village. Kelgava with the order to withdraw the Army headquarters to the command post. “During June 19, 3 rifle divisions (10th, 90th and 125th) were deployed. Units of these divisions were located in prepared trenches and bunkers. Long-term structures were not ready.
Even on the night of June 22, I personally received an order from the chief of staff of the front, KLENOV, in a very categorical form - to withdraw the troops from the border by dawn on June 22, withdraw them from the trenches, which I categorically refused to do and the troops remained in their positions.”
BAGRAMYAN IVAN KHRISTOFOROVICH, Marshal of the Soviet Union. In 1941 - head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District (Southwestern Front)
“The covering troops, the first operational echelon, were stationed directly at the borders and began deployment under the cover of fortified areas with the outbreak of hostilities.”
“Their advance entry to prepared positions was prohibited by the General Staff so as not to give a reason for provoking war on the part of Nazi Germany.”
IVANOV NIKOLAI PETROVICH, Major General. In 1941 - Chief of Staff of the 6th Army of the Kyiv Special Military District (Southwestern Front)
“While still in Transbaikalia and receiving intelligence reports, we felt an impending threat, since intelligence quite accurately determined the concentration of Nazi troops. I regarded the sudden appointment as Chief of Staff of the 6th Army in Lvov as a necessity of the pre-war period.
Despite the undeniable signs of a large concentration of German troops, the commander of the Kyiv Special Military District forbade the deployment of covering units, putting troops on combat readiness, and even more so strengthening them even after the start of shelling of the state border and air raids on the night of June 21-22, 1941. Only during the day. On June 22, this was allowed, when the Germans had already crossed the state border and were operating on our territory.”
“By dawn on June 22, families of border guards and some residents who had fled from the state border began to appear. In the city, shooting began from some houses and from bell towers along the city streets. Those caught with weapons turned out to be Ukrainian nationalists.
At dawn, information began to arrive about the landing of German troops to the east, southeast and south of the city of Lvov. The reconnaissance groups sent to these areas found nothing in them. Information about landings during all the months of the initial period of the war turned out to be false; they only irritated the troops and scattered our forces on unnecessary reconnaissance. It is possible that such data was transmitted by German agents sent to us in advance. I raised the question of permission to make another attempt to break through in an organized manner in the previously proposed direction.
“... it was decided to cover the signs on the tank with mud and move along the road to Smela during the day with the hatches closed, along with German vehicles that occasionally passed along the road.
This little trick was a success, and during the day we moved from Zvenigorod to Shpola, with German traffic controllers giving us the way. Hoping to continue to move with the Germans with impunity, we drove out onto the road leading from metro station Smela to Cherkassy.
The tank reached the blown-up bridge along the dam, but was fired at by German artillery with incendiary shells, and when turning, it slid off the dam and half sank.
Together with the crew, we left the tank and an hour later, having crossed the swamp, we joined up with our units in the sector of the 38th Army.”
ABRAMIDZE PAVEL IVLIANOVICH, Major General. In 1941 - Commander of the 72nd Rifle Division of the 8th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army of the Kyiv Special Military District (Southwestern Front)
“Before the treacherous attack... I and the commanders of the units of my formation did not know the contents of the mobilization plan, the so-called MP-41.
After its opening, in the first hour of the war, everyone was convinced that the defensive work, command and staff exercises with access to the field, proceeded strictly from the mobilization plan of 1941, developed by the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District and approved by the General Staff.”
“The troops directly covering the state border had detailed plans and documentation up to and including the regiment. Field positions were prepared for them along the entire border. These troops represented the first operational echelon.”
“The covering troops, the first operational echelon, were stationed directly at the borders and began deployment under the cover of fortified areas with the outbreak of hostilities. Their advance entry to prepared positions was prohibited by the General Staff so as not to give a reason for provoking war on the part of Nazi Germany.”
FOMIN BORIS ANDREEVICH, Major General. In 1941 - head of the operational department of the headquarters of the 12th Army of the Belarusian Special Military District (Western Front)
“Extracts from the plans for the defense of the state border (...) were kept at the headquarters of corps and divisions in sealed “red” bags.
The order to open the red packets from the district headquarters came on June 21. An enemy air strike (3.50 on June 22) caught the troops at the moment of their advance to occupy the defense.
According to the approved state border defense plan of 1941, in connection with the concentration of large German forces to the state border, an increase in the number of troops included in the plan was provided.”
“By June 21, 13 rifle divisions were fully concentrated on a 400-kilometer front along the state border (at a distance from 8 to 25-30 km from it), the 14th was on the way in the north-west region. edges of Belovezhskaya Pushcha.
At a depth of 250-300 km there were 6 more rifle divisions, 4 of them were on the move.”
“The divisions were not involved in border defense before the start of hostilities. Radio stations in army headquarters were destroyed by bombing.
Control had to be carried out by liaison officers, communications were maintained by U-2, SB aircraft, armored vehicles and passenger cars.”
“The difficulty of maintaining communications using only mobile means of communication was that these means were very limited. In addition, enemy aircraft destroyed these assets both in the air and on the ground.
It is enough to give the following example: on June 26 it was necessary to transmit a combat order to the armies to withdraw to the river line. Shara and further through Nalibokskaya Pushcha.
To deliver the encrypted order, I sent one U-2 plane to each army with the order to sit near the command post and hand over the order; one SB plane to each army with an order to drop a paratrooper near the command post with a coded order for delivery; and one armored vehicle with an officer to deliver the same encrypted order.
Results: all U-2s were shot down, all armored vehicles were burned; and only at the CP of the 10th Army 2 paratroopers with orders were dropped from the Security Council. To clarify the front line we had to use fighters.”
ZASHIBALOV MIKHAIL ARSENTIEVICH, Major General. In 1941 - Commander of the 86th Rifle Division of the 5th Rifle Corps of the 10th Army of the Belarusian Special Military District (Western Front)
“At one o’clock in the morning on June 22, 1941, the Corps Commander was called to the telephone and received the following instructions - to alert the division headquarters and regiment headquarters and assemble them at their location. Rifle regiments should not be raised on combat alert, why wait for his order.”
“The division chief of staff ordered to contact the border commandant’s offices and outposts and establish what the Nazi troops were doing and what our border commandant’s offices and outposts were doing on the State Border of the USSR.
At 2.00, the chief of staff of the division reported information received from the Head of the Nurskaya border outpost that fascist German troops were approaching the Western Bug River and were bringing up transportation means.”
“After the report of the division chief of staff at 2:10 a.m. on June 22, 1941, he ordered the “Storm” signal to be given, the rifle regiments to be alerted and a forced march to occupy sectors and areas of defense.
At 2.40 on June 22, I received an order to open the Corps Commander’s package, stored in my safe, from which I learned to raise the division on combat alert and act in accordance with the decision I made and the order for the division, which I did on my own initiative an hour earlier.”
The materials received by the Military Historical Directorate, authored by famous Soviet military leaders, were carefully studied and analyzed and formed the basis for fundamental scientific works describing the course of the Great Patriotic War
From the point of view of military specialists.
The answers to the first question were mixed. Some commanders reported that the plan was communicated to them in advance as far as it concerned and they had the opportunity to develop their plans with the construction of battle formations and the definition of combat areas. Others responded that they were not familiar with the plan, but received it in sealed packages directly in the first days of the war.
Thus, the chief of staff of the 28th Rifle Corps of the 4th Army of the Belarusian Special Military District, Lukin, explained that “... to check the reality... of the plan and instructions, before the start of the war, approximately in the period March-May 1941, at least two combat verification alarms were carried out in the presence of representatives command of the Western Military District..."
The commander of the 45th Rifle Division of the 5th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army of the Kyiv Special Military Corps, Sherstyuk, recalled the words of the commander of the 5th Army, conveyed to him by the commander of the 15th Rifle Corps, Colonel I.I. Fedyuninsky: “... Plan for the defense of the state border, places CP and NP will receive at the right time in a closed package; I prohibit the preparation of mobilization gaps in division garrisons, because this will give rise to panic.”
The commander of the 10th Infantry Division of the Baltic Special Military District, Fadeev, said: “I knew the plan for the defense of the state border of the Lithuanian SSR in terms of the defense zone of the 10th Infantry Division and the 125th Infantry Division defending on the left for its right flank.”
The commander of the 8th Army of the Baltic Special Military District, P.P. Sobennikov, recalled: “... having received an appointment to a position in March 1941, I, unfortunately, was neither at the General Staff at that time, nor upon arrival in Riga at the Headquarters Baltic Special Military District, was not informed about the “State Border Defense Plan of 1941.
Upon arrival at the headquarters of the 8th Army in Jelgava, I also did not find any instructions on this issue. I get the impression that it is unlikely that such a plan existed by this time (March 1941). The division headquarters and regimental headquarters worked out combat documents, orders, combat instructions, maps, diagrams, etc. Units of the division were trained to occupy their defense areas and fire installations from their locations... Artillery fire was planned in directions... Main and reserve command and observation posts from division headquarters to company commanders inclusive were identified and equipped.”
Only on May 28, 1941 (I remember this date very well), when I was called ... to the district headquarters, I was literally hastily familiarized with the “Defense Plan”. All this happened in a great hurry and in a somewhat nervous atmosphere. ... The plan was a rather voluminous, thick notebook, typed. ...My notes, as well as those of my chief of staff, were taken away. ...Unfortunately, after this no instructions were given and we did not even receive our workbooks.
However, the troops stationed on the border... were preparing field fortifications... and were practically oriented about their tasks and areas of defense. Possible options for action were played out during field trips (April-May)..."
If the first question was the same for everyone, then the second question was listed in two versions.
Almost all commanders noted that the units were preparing the defensive lines in advance until June 1941. The degree of readiness of fortified areas varied. Thus, the commander of the 45th Rifle Division of the 5th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army KOVO noted that in May-June 1941, units of the division, subject to great camouflage, built separate machine gun and artillery bunkers near the state border at a distance of approximately 2-5 km , as well as anti-tank ditches... The constructed earthen structures partially ensured the deployment and conduct of combat operations by division units.
The commander of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Division of the Kyiv Special Military District, Abramidze, reported that: “... the measures taken to strengthen the state border fully ensured the deployment and conduct of combat operations by units of the formation entrusted to me.
All units held the state border in cooperation with the 92nd and 93rd border detachments until June 28, i.e. until we received an order to leave the border..."
In the Baltic Special Military District, a defensive line along the state border on the front of Palanga, Kretinga, Klaipeda Highway and to the south, basically according to the plan, to the depth of the Minia River was prepared.
The defense (forefield) was built by resistance units, strongholds. Wood-earth and stone bunkers were built for all heavy machine guns, as well as regimental and anti-tank artillery.
In the Belarusian Special Military District, the defensive line along the state border consisted of a system of trenches, communication passages and wood-earth defensive structures, the construction of which had not yet been completed at the beginning of the war.
In the fall of 1940, the troops of the 28th Rifle Corps, according to the plan of the commander of the 4th Army, worked on the construction of military filling of the Brest-Litovsk fortified area: bunkers, trenches, and barriers.
Fortified area along the eastern bank of the river. The Bug was under construction. Individual structures and areas with completed structures were without garrisons and weapons, and the Brest fortified area, according to an eyewitness, due to its small numbers could not even protect against the penetration of unauthorized persons, as it should have been.
In the Belarusian Special Military District, before the enemy attack, no instructions or orders were received from the higher command, including the district headquarters, to raise troops and withdraw them to occupy defensive lines. Before the attack, all units were in their places of deployment. For example, the commander of the 86th Rifle Division received a personal order from the commander of the 5th Rifle Corps to assemble the division headquarters, regimental and battalion headquarters at 1.00 am on June 22. The same order ordered the unit not to raise a combat alert and to wait for a special order. An hour later, he received an order to open the package of the corps commander, stored in his safe, after which he raised the division on combat alert and acted on the decision and order he made for the division.
A similar situation arose in the Kiev Special Military District, where the order to put units on combat readiness and leave them in their garrisons was received from the higher command.
And even despite cases of German planes firing at Soviet troops and fighting with border guards, the 5th Army headquarters received instructions: “Don’t give in to provocation, don’t shoot at the planes... the Germans in some places began to fight our border outposts.
This is another provocation. Don't go for provocation. Raise the troops, but don’t give them any ammunition.”
How suddenly the war began for the troops can be judged, for example, by the fact that the personnel of the heavy artillery regiment, moving by rail at dawn on June 22, arrived at the station. Siauliai, having seen the bombing of our airfields, believed that “the maneuvers had begun.”
The 48th Infantry Division of the Baltic Special Military District, by order of the Commander of the District Troops, set out from Riga on the night of June 19 and moved towards the border with music and, not being aware of the imminent threat of war, was suddenly attacked from the air and by the German ground forces that had broken through. after which it suffered heavy losses and, before reaching the border, was defeated.
At dawn on June 22, almost all PriOVO aviation was burned at the airfields. Of the mixed air division attached to the 8th Army of the District, by 15:00 on June 22, 5 or 6 SB aircraft remained.
As for the participation of artillery in the first days of the war, most of it was at district and army gatherings in accordance with orders from district headquarters. As soon as active clashes with the enemy began, artillery units arrived on their own in the combat areas and took up the required positions. The units that remained in the places where their units were deployed took a direct part in supporting our troops as long as there was fuel for tractors. When the fuel ran out, the artillerymen were forced to blow up the guns and equipment.
The conditions in which our troops entered the war are described by all participants in the first battles in one word: “unexpectedly.” The situation was the same in all three districts. In the Belarusian Special Military District, the command staff of the 28th Rifle Corps was supposed to arrive for a demonstration exercise of the commander of the 4th Army at the artillery range in Medyn (Brest region) at 5.00 am on June 22.
At the time of the attack in Brest-Litovsk, electrical and telephone communications immediately stopped working, since the corps headquarters did not have field communications with the divisions, and control was disrupted. Communication was maintained by sending messages in officers' vehicles. In the same Belarusian Special Military District, the commander of the 330th Infantry Regiment of the 86th Infantry Division of the 5th Infantry Corps of the 10th Combined Arms Army reported at 8.00 on the morning of June 22 that he counterattacked the enemy on the move with a force of more than two battalions and in cooperation with a separate reconnaissance battalion of the division, border commandant's office and outposts put the enemy to flight and restored the lost position with frontline border outposts in the Smolekhi, Zaremba section along the state border of the USSR.
Units of the 99th Infantry Division of the 26th Army of the Kyiv Special Military District were located on the state border, being in constant combat readiness and in a very short time could occupy their harrow sectors, but conflicting orders coming from the high command did not allow our artillerymen to open fire against the enemy until 10.00 am on June 22. And only at 4.00 am on June 23, after a 30-minute artillery barrage, our troops knocked the enemy out of the city of Przemysl they occupied and liberated the city, where there were many Soviet citizens, including families of officers.
Units of the divisions of the 5th Army of the Kyiv Special Military District entered into battle with the Germans in extremely difficult conditions, since the fighting began suddenly and came as a surprise, while one third of the troops were on defensive work, and the corps artillery was at an army camp gathering.
In the Baltic Special Military District, the Germans began the war at 4.00 am on June 22 with artillery preparation and direct fire at bunkers, border outposts, and populated areas, creating many fires, after which they went on the offensive.
The enemy concentrated his main efforts in the Palanga-Libava direction, along the Baltic Sea coast bypassing the city of Kretinga, along the Klaipeda highway.
Units of the 10th Infantry Division repelled German attacks with fire and repeatedly launched counterattacks and fought stubborn defensive battles throughout the entire depth of the forefield to the river. Miniya, Plungi, Retovas.
In view of the current situation, by the end of June 22, the division commander received an order from the commander of the 10th Rifle Corps to withdraw.
From June 22 to September 30, 1941, this division retreated and fought in the Baltic states, after which it was loaded onto transport in Tallinn and withdrawn to Kronstadt and Strelno.
In general, all participants in the first days of the war noted the readiness of the headquarters to control troops. Having recovered from the sudden blow, the headquarters took over the leadership of the fighting. Difficulties in command and control of troops were manifested in almost everything: understaffing of some headquarters, lack of the required number of communications equipment (radio and transport), headquarters security, vehicles for movements, broken wire communications. Management of the rear was difficult due to the “district-regiment” supply system that remained from peacetime.
The memories of eyewitnesses and direct participants in the first days of the war are certainly not without subjectivity, however, their stories are proof that the Soviet government and high command, realistically assessing the situation in the period 1940-1941, felt that the country and army were incompletely prepared to repel an attack from the side of Nazi Germany - a strong and well-armed enemy due to the robbery of the countries of Western Europe, with two years of experience in combat operations. Based on the objective reality of that time, by ordering the troops to be put on full combat readiness, the country's leadership did not want to give Hitler a reason to start a war in extremely unfavorable conditions for us, they hoped to delay the war.
PHOTO: Photo from ITAR-TASS dossierIn total, the cycle contains more than 100 pages of first-published memoirs of Soviet military leaders, among which the memos of the Marshal of the Soviet Union stand out Ivan Bagramyan.
In June 1941, he met the war as the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District, which was renamed the Southwestern Front at the beginning of hostilities.
PHOTO: official website of the Russian Ministry of Defense
Military history buffs will undoubtedly be interested in the memories of the deputy chief of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District (later the North-Western Front) Kuzma Derevyanko, which provide a comprehensive assessment of the quality of intelligence provision to the district and front command on the eve of the war.
A unique feature of the materials is the strict and military-like clear formulations of Soviet military leaders when assessing the condition of the troops entrusted to them on the eve of the war. They contain comprehensive information about the progress of troop deployment and the degree of readiness of defensive lines along the state border before the outbreak of war. Many military leaders also shared personal memories of the situation in which their units and formations first entered into battle with Nazi troops.
The background to the birth of these unique evidence is also interesting in itself. In 1952, a group was created in the Military Historical Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army under the leadership of Colonel General Alexander Pokrovsky, which, following fresh tracks, began to develop a description of the battles of the recently past war.
For a more complete and objective presentation of the events of the initial period of hostilities, questions related to the period of deployment of troops of the Baltic, Kyiv and Belarusian special military districts under the “State Border Defense Plan of 1941” on the eve of the Nazi invasion were formulated and sent to key addressees.
The released archives contain frank answers from the commanders of districts, armies, corps and division commanders who controlled the troops in the first days of the war.
DIRECT SPEECH
Boris Yulin, historian, military expert:
The benefit of this publication is that it greatly facilitates access to archival documents for military history buffs. In my opinion, it does not contain any special news. The deployment of Red Army troops in the border special military districts according to the “State Border Defense Plan of 1941” on the eve of the Nazi invasion was already described in sufficient detail and many times back in Soviet times, both in memoirs and in official historiography. Modern technology for digitizing paper media makes it possible to publish declassified archival funds on a massive scale, but, unfortunately, this process is still very, very slow.
On the anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War, a section appeared on the website of the Ministry of Defense in which you can get acquainted with unique eyewitness accounts.
In 1952, a special group under the Military Historical Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army began work on a description of the events of the Great Patriotic War.
Those who commanded districts, armies, corps and divisions at the beginning of the war received a list of five questions. Military leaders, in particular, were asked why in June 1941 most of the artillery of corps and divisions was in training camps, how prepared the headquarters of their unit was for command and control of troops, and to what extent this affected the course of operations in the first days of the war.
Now some of these previously classified historical documents have become available to Internet users.
Despite the dry military language used by senior officers to describe the events of June 22, 1941, a clear picture emerges of what they had to endure in the early days of the German invasion.
Pyotr Sobennikov, in 1941 - commander of the 8th Army of the Baltic Special Military District (North-Western Front):
“How unexpectedly the war began for the approaching troops can be judged, for example, by the fact that the personnel of the heavy artillery regiment, moving along the railway at dawn on June 22, arrived at the station. When Siauliai saw the bombing of our airfields, he believed that maneuvers had begun.
And at this time, almost all the aviation of the Baltic Military District was burned at the airfields. For example, from the mixed air division, which was supposed to support the 8th Army, by 15:00 on June 22, only 5 or 6 SB aircraft remained.”
The suddenness of the attack led to the fact that in the first hours the war was perceived by some commanders simply as a provocation that should not be succumbed to:
“Don’t give in to provocation, don’t shoot at the planes! ... The Germans began to fight in some places with our border posts.
This is another provocation. Don't go for provocation. Raise the troops, but don’t give them any ammunition.”
The documents also give an idea of the personal courage of the command staff during the most difficult hours of the war.
Nikolai Ivanov, in 1941 - chief of staff of the 6th Army of the Kyiv Special Military District (Southwestern Front):
“...It was decided to cover the signs on the tank with mud and move along the road to Smela during the day with the hatches closed, along with German vehicles that occasionally passed along the road. This little trick was a success, and during the day we moved from Zvenigorod to Shpola, with German traffic controllers giving us the way.
Hoping to continue to move with the Germans with impunity, we drove out onto the road leading from metro station Smela to Cherkassy. The tank reached the blown-up bridge along the dam, but was fired at by German artillery with incendiary shells, and when turning, it slid off the dam and half sank. Together with the crew, we left the tank and an hour later, crossing the swamp, we joined up with our units in the sector of the 38th Army.”
Mikhail Zashibalov, in 1941 - commander of the 86th Rifle Division of the 5th Rifle Corps of the 10th Army of the Belarusian Special Military District (Western Front):
“I ordered the division chief of staff to contact the border commandant’s offices and outposts and establish what the Nazi troops were doing and what our border commandant’s offices and outposts were doing on the State Border of the USSR.
At 2 hours 00 minutes, the division chief of staff reported information received from the head of the Nurskaya border outpost that fascist German troops were approaching the Western Bug River and were bringing up crossing facilities.
After the report of the division chief of staff at 2 hours 10 minutes on June 22, 1941, I ordered the “Storm 2” signal to be given, the rifle regiments to be alerted and a forced march to occupy sectors and areas of defense.
At 2 hours 40 minutes on June 22, I received an order to open the package of the corps commander, stored in my safe, from which I learned that I must raise the division on combat alert and act in accordance with the decision I made and the order for the division, which I did - on my initiative an hour earlier.”
At the moment, the section of the Ministry of Defense website “This is how the war began” presents detailed testimony from seven military leaders in the form of answers to five questions.
MOSCOW, June 22 – RIA Novosti. The USSR had information about the German attack two to three months before the invasion, and a day before it, the Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Georgy Zhukov ordered the border military districts to prepare for defense, it follows from declassified documents about the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, published on Friday on website of the Ministry of Defense.
According to them, the German attack took some units and formations of the Red Army by surprise.
The command and headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District in 1941 had information about the German attack on the USSR two to three months before the invasion, says a declassified letter from the deputy head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Northwestern Front, Lieutenant General Kuzma Derevyanko.
Derevianko also pointed out that the grouping of German troops on the eve of the war in the Memel region, in East Prussia and in the Suwalki region in the last days before the war was known to the district headquarters quite fully and in detail.
“The discovered group of Nazi troops on the eve of hostilities was regarded by the intelligence department of the district headquarters as an offensive group with a significant saturation of tanks and motorized units,” he wrote.
According to Derevianko, starting from the second week of the war, much attention was paid to the organization of detachments sent behind enemy lines for the purpose of reconnaissance and sabotage, as well as the organization of radio-equipped reconnaissance groups behind enemy lines and radio-equipped points in the territory occupied by our troops, in case of their forced withdrawal .
“In the following months, the information received from our groups and detachments working behind enemy lines improved all the time and was of great value. It was reported on personally observed concentrations of Nazi troops in the border areas, starting from the end of February, on reconnaissance carried out by German officers along the border, the Germans preparing artillery positions, intensifying the construction of long-term defensive structures in the border zone, as well as gas and bomb shelters in the cities of East Prussia,” follows from a letter from the deputy head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the North-Western Front.
The Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Georgy Zhukov was informed about the German attack planned for June 22, 1941 and ordered the border military districts to prepare for defense.
"During June 22-23, 1941, a surprise attack by the Germans is possible on the fronts of the LVO (Leningrad Military District - ed.), PRIBVO (Baltic Military District - ed.), ZAPOVO (Western Military District - ed.), KOVO (Kiev Special Military district - ed.), ODVO (Odessa Military District - ed.). An attack by the Germans could begin with provocative actions,” says the encrypted message marked “Top Secret.”
In the order, Zhukov, on the one hand, demanded not to succumb to provocative actions, but at the same time, the border military districts were to be on combat readiness, “to meet a sudden attack by the Germans or their allies.”
In this regard, he ordered the troops to secretly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border during the night of June 22, disperse all aircraft at airfields before dawn, camouflage other equipment, and put all military units on combat readiness. He demanded that blackout measures be prepared—to reduce lighting in cities and at strategic sites.
“No other activities will be carried out without special orders,” the document says.
The second Soviet order was the instruction of Soviet aviation to bomb Koenigsberg and Memel, to strike deep into German territory, but not for ground troops to cross the border.
“Use powerful strikes from bomber and attack aircraft to destroy aviation at enemy airfields and bomb the main groupings of its ground forces. Air strikes should be carried out to a depth of German territory up to 100-150 km, bomb Koenigsberg and Memel. Do not carry out raids on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions are given.” , says the document signed by People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko, Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov, and member of the Main Military Council Georgy Malenkov.
“In connection with the unheard-of impudence of the attack on the Soviet Union by Germany, I order: the troops, with all their might and means, attack enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border. From now on, until further notice, ground troops should not cross the border. Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the concentration areas of enemy aviation and the grouping of its ground forces,” the document says.
The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on its website published details of the air “rams” at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, for which their participants were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the first time since the beginning of the war. Among these documents are excerpts from a brief combat history of the 158th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Leningrad Military District with a description of the exploits of junior lieutenants Pyotr Kharitonov and Stepan Zdorovtsev.
The 158th Fighter Aviation Regiment entered combat operations against the Germans on June 22, 1941. The regiment was tasked with covering the cities and communications of the Pskov region during the approach of Soviet troops and conducting reconnaissance.
On June 27, the regiment's pilots opened a tally of destroyed German planes. The next day, June 28, Kharitonov and Zdorovtsev were the first to carry out an aerial “ram” on the Northern Front. With a difference of one hour, they rammed the German Junkers 88 bombers with the propellers of their planes in an air battle. The actions of Kharitonov and Zdorovtsev are illustrated in diagrams also provided by the Ministry of Defense.
On July 8, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kharitonov and Zdorovtsev were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. According to the published award material for Zdorovtsev, he was awarded “for fighting German fascism.” The day after the signing of the decree, Zdorovtsev, while performing reconnaissance in the Pskov region, did not return from a combat mission. Colleagues saw how his plane was attacked and crashed.
In 1965, by order of the USSR Minister of Defense, Hero of the Soviet Union, junior lieutenant Stepan Zdorovtsev was forever included in the lists of the 332nd Separate Guards Helicopter Regiment.
Soldiers of the 42nd Rifle Division in the Brest Fortress from the evening of June 22 to the afternoon of June 23, 1941, destroyed four aircraft and up to 16 tanks of the Wehrmacht army. The defense of the Brest Fortress is one of the first and most dramatic episodes of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Exactly 77 years ago, at four in the morning, the fortress was the first to receive the blow of German troops. Its defenders, soldiers of more than 30 nationalities of the USSR, resisted for at least a month without water, food and communications, with an acute shortage of ammunition and medicine, remaining deep in the rear of the Wehrmacht, which was advancing on Moscow.
“Under the influence of a strong attack from the flanks of enemy aircraft and tanks, units of the division began to retreat, fighting using the mobile defense method, and by the end of the day 06/22/41 to 12:00 06/23/41 they destroyed four enemy aircraft and up to 16 tanks,” says the declassified political conclusion of the chief political propaganda department of the 42nd Infantry Division.
In the political report of the head of the political department of the 6th Infantry Division, the remnants of which became part of the 55th Infantry Division, it is written that the area of the Brest fortress and the fortress itself were subjected to exceptional bombardment. The enemy's first shells disabled most of the commanding personnel who lived in or near the fortress itself, as well as the artillery park, stables, garages, warehouses and headquarters.
As noted, up to two-thirds of the personnel and over 90% of the material part of the divisional and regimental artillery were lost. However, the duty anti-aircraft battery with two guns disabled seven enemy aircraft. Another battery fired at the crossings, preventing the enemy from occupying the territory. As of July 5, 1941, there were 910 people left in the division (staffing requirements - 13,691). Of these, 515 are private soldiers, 123 are junior commanding officers, 272 are middle and senior commanding officers.
As follows from the declassified decree on awarding orders and medals of the USSR to the commanding and rank and file of the Red Army dated July 22, 1941, the awards included the commander of the gun of the first battery of the 141st GAP, junior sergeant Ivan Andreev, gunner of the 152-mm howitzer T. Medzhazhaev, commander guns of the 111th Infantry Regiment, senior sergeant Vasily Rasskazov, deputy head of the political propaganda department of the Fourth Army Vladimir Semenkov and deputy battery commander for political affairs Vladimir Tumanov (Andreev and Semenkov - posthumously).
